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NOT SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS:  BRIDGING 
GARNER AND GRAHAM 
Eric Szkarlat* 
INTRODUCTION 
Black and brown families across America know “the talk.”1  Parents of 
color warn their children about inevitable police encounters, which too often 
turn deadly2 even when citizens of color comply with police orders.3  But 
nonfatal force often does not appear reasonable either:  when a nine-year-old 
Black girl failed to comply with orders,4 the police officer pepper sprayed 
her and said, “You did it to yourself.”5 
What in the law justifies the use of such force?  As this Essay 
demonstrates, existing case law permits it.6  Even U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Sotomayor noted the Court’s reticence to offer basic protection from 
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.7  Such deference to police 
officers’ split-second decisions is acutely dangerous; in 2015 alone, police 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. & B.T.A., 2013, University 
of Michigan.  Thank you to my late professor William “Buzz” Alexander for making space 
for me and so many others to confront racism in criminal law, and thanks to the staff of the 
Fordham Law Review for this bold project. 
 
 1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 2. See German Lopez, Black Parents Describe “The Talk” They Give to Their Children 
About Police, VOX (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/8/12401792/ 
police-black-parents-the-talk [https://perma.cc/R84K-EG7A]. 
 3. See, e.g., Mitch Smith, Video of Police Killing of Philando Castile Is Publicly 
Released, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/police-
shooting-castile-trial-video.html [https://perma.cc/4L6E-WJNT]. 
 4. Deepti Hajela & Lindsay Whitehurst, ‘I Am a Child!’:  Pepper Spray Reflects Policing 
of Black Kids, AP NEWS (Feb. 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/policing-black-kids-
6708e9f229ed9d28b9c60a41ea988b59 [https://perma.cc/9VAJ-KV9K]. 
 5. Janelle Griffith, ‘You Did It to Yourself,’ Officer Tells 9-Year-Old Girl Pepper-
Sprayed by Police in Newly Released Video, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2021, 3:41 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/you-did-it-yourself-officer-tells-9-year-old-girl-
n1257630 [https://perma.cc/LWC2-9LMM]. 
 6. See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1189 
(2017). 
 7. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By sanctioning 
a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment hollow.”). 
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killed an estimated 1240 civilians.8  Further, excessive force has a disparate 
racial impact.9 
However, a recent shift in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence emphasized personal security enumerated as a positive right in 
the amendment’s guarantee “to be secure in their persons.”10  This Essay 
explores the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment and applies it to 
excessive force cases.  Part I reviews the Fourth Amendment’s text and its 
application in excessive force cases.  Part II examines the substantive 
elements the Court considered in Tennessee v. Garner11 and their absence in 
the later cases Graham v. Connor12 and Scott v. Harris.13  Part III synthesizes 
the Graham balancing test with the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning 
to reinterpret and revitalize the substantive elements of the Garner analysis. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF GRAHAM 
The Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against police use of excessive force in arrests.14  
Most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence centers on what is “reasonable.”15  
Perhaps courts focus on reasonableness because it defines what kinds of 
government searches and seizures courts will permit.  But key text also 
establishes a personal security right.16  Part I.A begins by examining that text 
and the right to personal security.  Part I.B discusses the three major cases 
governing police use of force in arrests. 
A.  Force and the Fourth Amendment 
Policing agencies organize force on a continuum17 that authorizes greater 
force as a suspect resists arrest.18  Suspects generally must comply with 
police orders or else experience greater force.19  Because of this escalating 
 
 8. Carl Bialik, A New Estimate of Killings by Police Is Way Higher—And Still Too Low, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 6, 2015, 4:07 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-new-
estimate-of-killings-by-police-is-way-higher-and-still-too-low/ [https://perma.cc/W2J6-
XN4E] (extrapolating reported data to include nonreporting agencies and estimating 1240 
people killed by police).  The United States surpasses its international democratic counterparts 
in police violence. Evelyn Michalos, Note, Time over Matter:  Measuring the Reasonableness 
of Officer Conduct in § 1983 Claims, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2020). 
 9. Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 
211, 288 (2017). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 
25, 2021). 
 11. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 12. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 13. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 14. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
 15. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”). 
 16. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 17. When evaluating force, courts generally defer to a police officer’s discretion. See 
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 223, 269–70. 
 18. Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1185–86. 
 19. Id. 
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force continuum, excessive force cases typically involve significant bodily 
injury and death.20  Yet existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence scantly 
protects against injury and death in forcible arrests.  In fact, courts reviewing 
excessive force cases rarely focus on the scope of the positive rights the 
Fourth Amendment affords.21  Further, remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations tend to be weak or unavailable in excessive force cases.22 
From the Fourth Amendment language articulating “the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons,”23 the Supreme Court recently revived the 
Fourth Amendment interest in “personal security” in the excessive force 
context when it decided Torres v. Madrid.24  Earlier decisions discussed 
personal security,25 but later cases retreated from the term.26  One sitting 
justice dissented from the majority opinion in Torres and characterized 
personal security as “penumbral” to the Fourth Amendment.27  However, the 
majority rebutted this notion, saying that personal security is anything but 
penumbral:  it is textual.28 
Case discussions of “personal security” often relate to common law.29  
William Blackstone defined the individual right to “personal security” as “a 
person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of” life, limbs, body, health, and 
reputation.30  He noted that the threat of losing one’s “life, or . . . limbs, in 
case of [one’s] non-compliance” voids otherwise legally executed acts.31  
His contemporaries who drafted the ratified Fourth Amendment almost 
certainly knew of this terminology.32  Because virtually all modern police 
use of force to effectuate an arrest carries the possibility for serious injury to 
 
 20. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 390 (1989) (involving bruising, lacerations, and 
broken bones); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (involving the death of a young boy 
suspected of burglary who fled from police). 
 21. See Luke M. Milligan, The Forgotten Right to Be Secure, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 713, 717–
18 (2014); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1181, 1264 (2016) (noting that the right to be secure is a positive right). 
 22. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law:  A 
Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
237, 239–44 (discussing the relative weakness of four Fourth Amendment remedies). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 24. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (recognizing an “inestimable right to personal 
security”). 
 26. One case relegated “personal security” to footnotes of the dissenting opinion. See 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637 n.12, 646 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1991). 
 27. Torres, slip op. at 24, 26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 17 (majority opinion). 
 29. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting a common law tort case, Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
 30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. 
 31. Id. at *130 (emphasis added). 
 32. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 679–80 n.363 (1999).  The final amendment differed significantly from earlier versions. 
Compare Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 79, 96 (1999) 
(“[T]he Citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures of their papers, 
houses, persons, or property.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting an early draft), 
with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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“life” and “limb” as a result of noncompliance,33 all excessive force cases 
implicate the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in personal security. 
B.  Excessive Force at the Supreme Court 
Three cases represent the Supreme Court’s current excessive force 
jurisprudence.  This section discusses those cases in chronological order:  
first Garner, then Graham, and finally Scott. 
1.  Tennessee v. Garner 
Police suspected that Edward Garner, an unarmed Black fifteen-year-old, 
committed burglary.34  To seize him, an officer shot Garner in the head as he 
ran away, killing Garner.35  Ten dollars and a purse were found on Garner’s 
person.36  His family sued the Memphis, Tennessee Police Department and 
brought claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.37 
The Supreme Court applied the conventional Fourth Amendment 
balancing test, which weighs the government’s interests in effectuating the 
seizure against the intrusion the seizure placed on Garner.38  Noting that the 
“intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,”39 the 
Court elaborated that deadly force “frustrates” the individual’s interests in 
due process and fair punishment.40  Thus, the Court held that officers may 
not use deadly force to effectuate an arrest unless they have probable cause 
to believe that the person poses a significant threat of death or serious injury 
either to the officer or to others.41 
Scholars typically understand Garner to represent a bright-line rule in 
cases where officers use deadly force.42  But it laid the groundwork for more 
permissive cases when it hinted, but did not hold, that the courts should 
review all excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.43  Justice 
Byron White’s analysis suggested that due process, protected at the state 
level by the Fourteenth Amendment,44 was somehow within the rights 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.45  Perhaps more problematically for 
 
 33. See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1212. 
 34. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 4 n.2 (1985); see also Kevin P. Jenkins, Police 
Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities:  Ways to Stop the Killing, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 
1, 6 (1992). 
 35. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4. 
 36. Id. at 4. 
 37. Id. at 5. 
 38. Id. at 7–8. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1119, 1128 (2008). 
 43. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 45. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. 
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later courts,46 Garner expressly abrogated the common law rule permitting 
deadly force in felony arrests by noting that technological advances cast 
doubt upon that rule.47 
2.  Graham v. Connor 
When Dethorne Graham, a diabetic Black man, experienced an insulin 
reaction, a friend drove him to a convenience store to purchase orange 
juice.48  Upon entering, Graham saw that the store had a long checkout line, 
so he decided not to wait.49  The police officer, Connor, became suspicious 
when he witnessed Graham enter and quickly leave the store.50  He arrested 
Graham, who pled with officers to check his diabetic card.51  Officers told 
him to “shut up” and threw him headfirst into the police car.52  Graham 
suffered a broken foot, wrist lacerations, forehead bruises, and a shoulder 
injury; he also complained of a persistent loud ringing in his right ear.53  
Graham brought a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.54 
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court declared that the proper test to 
apply to any excessive force claim—deadly or not—was the Fourth 
Amendment objective reasonableness test.55  The Court rejected Graham’s 
Fourteenth Amendment claim, holding that substantive due process is 
inapplicable because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual 
source controlling officer conduct.56  Reasoning that officers must make 
split-second decisions, the Court ruled that an officer’s use of force cannot 
be evaluated with “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”57  The decision also 
enumerated three factors for courts to weigh in excessive force cases:  (1) the 
severity of the crime alleged; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to anyone’s safety; and (3) whether the suspect is resisting arrest or 
attempting to flee.58  Despite heavy criticism,59 Graham continues to control 
in excessive force cases. 
 
 46. See infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
 47. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13. 
 48. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388; Charles Lane, Opinion, A 1989 Supreme Court Ruling Is 




 49. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 390. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 392. 
 56. Id. at 395. 
 57. Id. at 396. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 42, at 1129–40 (criticizing the Graham factors and their 
application in subsequent cases). 
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3.  Scott v. Harris 
In 2007, the Court had the opportunity to apply Graham again.  While 
driving on a highway, Black nineteen-year-old Victor Harris exceeded the 
speed limit by eighteen miles per hour.60  Officers, including Deputy 
Timothy Scott, began pursuing him.61  Harris increased his speed to elude 
capture.62  To terminate the chase, Scott crashed his own bumper into 
Harris’s car.63  The crash left Harris with quadriplegia.64 
Surprisingly, the majority opinion in Scott cited the seemingly on-point 
Graham decision only twice.65  Justice Antonin Scalia spent most of the 
decision criticizing Garner.66  He configured Garner as an application of the 
later-decided Graham.67  He reasoned that the question of whether Scott used 
deadly force was irrelevant,68 suggesting that Garner may not constitute a 
bright-line test after all.69  Justice Scalia also argued that the danger present 
to pedestrians and other motorists justified the government’s intrusion on 
Harris, so Scott’s use of force was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.70  Blurring the lines between deadly and nondeadly force, Scott 
weakened Garner’s holding. 
II.  THE IMBALANCE IN THE FORCE TEST 
Garner represents the last major case in which the Supreme Court applied 
a balancing test which seriously discussed any individual interests to 
excessive force claims.71  Because textualists have reacted to the Garner 
holding’s mixed approach72 with some disapproval, current excessive force 
doctrine fails to afford individual Fourth Amendment interests adequate 
weight.  Thus, Graham predominates, but applying its test has failed to 
account for personal security.  Part II.A revisits Garner to better understand 
what individual Fourth Amendment interests the Court weighed.  Part II.B 
examines how the Court’s refusal to consider those interests led to 
imbalanced decisions in Graham and Scott. 
 
 60. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007). 
 61. Id. at 374–75. 
 62. Harris later said he ran because he feared going to jail for driving on a suspended 
license. See Why I Ran:  Christie/Victor (A&E television broadcast Oct. 12, 2008) 
(interviewing Victor Harris). 
 63. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 381–82. 
 66. Id. at 381–83. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 383. 
 69. See Harmon, supra note 42, at 1135–37. 
 70. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–84. 
 71. Torres did not reach the balancing test, ruling only that an application of physical 
force with intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-
292, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 72. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Which Amendment in Garner? 
The Garner decision’s evocation of constitutional rights enumerated in 
other amendments might have led subsequent decisions to emphasize Fourth 
Amendment interests.73  The Garner Court called a person’s life an 
“unmatched” interest.74  It further analyzed the individual and societal 
interests in due process and meaningful punishment.75  The Garner approach 
seemed in tune with the Fourteenth Amendment, while Graham and Scott 
more heavily emphasized the government’s interests under the Fourth 
Amendment.76 
Yet Garner also couched its analysis squarely within the Fourth 
Amendment.77  The Court did not stray into questions of unfairness, for 
example, which would draw originalist ire.78  Rather, the decision’s attention 
appeared to focus de facto on personal security from unreasonable seizure.79  
Killing Garner for having $10 and a purse on him was unreasonable because 
his personal security interest—his life—outweighed any government 
interest.80  Thus, while the Court’s analysis was not grounded in 
constitutional text, it could have been:  the Court could have emphasized the 
first part of the Fourth Amendment.81  By failing to do so, the Garner Court 
set into motion several decades of permissive Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence which have given police a blank check for brutality.82 
B.  The Graham Imbalance 
In contrast to Garner, the Graham test weighs strikingly few individual 
interests.  Graham outlined the conventional Fourth Amendment test83 that 
balances the government’s interest in executing the search or seizure against 
its intrusiveness on the individual’s interests.84  In the context of arrests, 
courts consider the individual interests that the Fourth Amendment 
protects.85  Thus, considerations of procedural and substantive due process, 
as well as cruel and unusual punishment, are inapposite.86 
 
 73. See supra notes 55, 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 74. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 
(1989). 
 77. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
 78. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 249 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(decrying substantive due process claims involving “unfairness”). 
 79. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1189 (“The constitutional law of police force is not 
indeterminate, but determinately permissive.”). 
 83. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
 86. See Graham at 395; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (discussing the 
balancing test). 
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Nevertheless, the Graham Court did not clearly articulate any individual 
interests to consider.87  It noted three relevant factors which focused almost 
exclusively on the government’s interest.88  Graham’s diabetes figured into 
the Court’s factual summary, but not its analysis.89  If the Court had 
apprehended that Graham had a right to be secure in his person, then his 
health would factor into the analysis.90   
Justice Scalia in Scott likewise failed to perform a serious balancing test.  
He dismissed the question of whether the officer’s driving maneuver 
constituted “deadly” force.91  Justice Scalia stated that Harris endangered 
others by fleeing;92 perhaps he reasoned that Harris waived his Fourth 
Amendment rights by engaging in reckless and dangerous conduct.93  But 
nowhere did Justice Scalia note evidence at trial showing that Scott was not 
trained in the maneuver he used on Harris.94  He also ignored that Scott 
admitted the maneuver was wrongfully executed.95  Recognizing Harris’s 
Fourth Amendment right to his limbs might have forced the Court to justify 
this trial evidence.96  As it was, Justice Scalia did not identify any significant 
counterweight to the government’s interest in arrest. 
Taking language from the Garner dissent, Graham itself repudiated 
Garner by emphasizing officers’ “split-second judgments.”97  Graham’s 
attorneys initially saw the decision as a victory because it would move the 
burden away from difficult-to-prove subjective tests.98  Instead, by offering 
overly simplistic factors99 and limiting the role race can play in an excessive 
force complaint,100 the shift to an objective standard yielded another 
manipulable and preclusive standard.101  As a result, the Graham standard 
did not improve, and might have worsened, the reality of racist police 
violence.102 
 
 87. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (identifying three factors to determine reasonableness, 
but not identifying the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 231. 
 90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  An attorney for Graham later said that they 
lost on remand. More Perfect, Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, WNYCSTUDIOS, at 
28:24–29:50 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolabmoreperfect/ 
episodes/mr-graham-and-reasonable-man [https://perma.cc/J9ZF-6FER]. 
 91. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381–83. 
 92. See id. at 384. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 234. 
 95. Id. at 235. 
 96. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also 
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 232. 
 98. See Lane, supra note 48. 
 99. See Harmon, supra note 42, at 1131. 
 100. See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment:  
Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham 
v. Connor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1465, 1486 (2018) (finding a drop in federal court treatments 
of race in police violence after Graham). 
 101. Id. at 1497 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by Graham[ ]actually produces 
racialized police violence . . . .”). 
 102. See id.; Lane, supra note 48. 
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III.  GUARANTEEING PERSONAL SECURITY 
The Court’s retreat from Garner resembles the retreat from “personal 
security.”103  In both areas, restrained justices retreated from reasoning which 
appeared to “posit penumbras.”104  However, the Court’s recent revival of 
personal security invites the revival of Garner.105  Thus, by drawing on the 
original meaning of “personal security” and reframing Garner in this light, 
reviewing courts can properly balance the Graham factors against the 
individual’s personal security interests. 
The original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment guarantees the 
right of personal security from unreasonable arrest.106  But when nearly 26 
percent of people killed by police are Black—while Black people make up 
only about 13 percent of the national population107—there is a material 
reason why Black families have “the talk.”108  Current jurisprudence on 
excessive force allows police, regardless of any officer’s intent, to make 
Black families fear for their lives in police encounters.109  Ultimately, the 
question should be:  what does it mean to be secure in one’s person from an 
unreasonable seizure?110 
Some critics may argue this definition of personal security—including life, 
limb, body, health, and reputation111—is too sweeping.  Further, they might 
argue that the common law allowed the use of deadly force to effectuate 
felony arrest, and because the Framers of the Fourth Amendment were 
certainly aware of this practice, their omission is actually a commission of 
the practice.  But their interpretation of the Fourth Amendment cannot stand.  
First, the requirement of “reasonableness” counterbalances the breadth of 
personal security.112  Where the government’s interest in the arrest outweigh 
the individual’s interest in personal security, the government prevails.113  
Second, the Framers had no concept of massive, professionalized municipal 
police forces armed with handguns such that the Framers could exclude 
routine forcible arrest, sometimes by shooting, from the Constitution’s 
protections.114  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment’s text broadly protects the 
people from fear of unreasonable seizure.115  Read with the original public 
 
 103. Compare supra notes 65–70, 97–102 and accompanying text (describing the retreat 
from Garner), with supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text (describing the retreat from 
personal security). 
 104. Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 24 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 105. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 107. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 288. 
 108. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 110. Milligan, supra note 21, at 734–37. 
 111. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 112. Some scholars argue that “unreasonable” originally meant nonconformity to common 
law. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 21, at 1264. 
 113. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 8–9 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 115. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
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meaning of “personal security” in mind,116 the Fourth Amendment text is the 
elephant “before us,”117 sweepingly protecting life, limb, and reputation.118  
Thus, reviewing courts should weigh Blackstone’s definition of personal 
security against the government’s interest in arrest.119 
Reading the Fourth Amendment to consider the right to personal security 
in excessive force cases should not have unintended consequences in the 
search context.120  Blackstone’s commentary on the right to personal security 
demonstrates that the original public meaning of a right “to be secure” in 
one’s person meant freedom from the fear of losing life and limb for failure 
to comply with law enforcement.121  Threats to this right are virtually 
inapplicable in the search context.122  Searches alone do not kill, maim, or 
destroy reputations.  Excessive force in arrest does. 
Continuing to follow the Graham test without recognizing the role of the 
right to personal security in the Fourth Amendment will continue the Court’s 
permissive attitude toward police brutality.123  Ultimately, Justice Scalia 
correctly determined that Garner was an application of Graham.124  Both 
decisions focus on reasonableness,125 but each decision construes it 
differently.126  In Graham and Scott, the Court failed to mention the 
individual interest in personal security and created an imbalanced result.127  
Courts should restore the balance of the interests by considering the right to 
personal security in every excessive force case.128 
Garner, however unartfully, alludes to the role personal security must play 
in the analysis.129  When the Garner Court weighed Edward Garner’s 
interests in life and due process, their decision can be understood within 
 
 116. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 117. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). 
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Blackstone’s definition of “personal security”130 in which life is an express 
interest and “due process” implicates one’s “reputation.”131  Recognizing 
these interests to lie within the Fourth Amendment was necessary but never 
done in Graham or Scott.132  The Graham Court, for example, should have 
balanced Dethorne Graham’s health against the need to arrest him.133  
Similarly, the Scott Court should have balanced Victor Harris’s interest in 
the use of his limbs against the need to stop him from speeding.134  Perhaps 
this balancing test would not have changed the result in these cases.135  But 
this test would force reviewing courts to do more than rubber-stamp police 
conduct. 
Justice Scalia rightly blurred the lines between deadly force and other 
types of force.136  Because police organize force along a continuum,137 all 
excessive force cases evoke the right to personal security.138  Imagining a 
situation where another Dethorne Graham dies at the hands of another Officer 
Connor is not difficult; people with disabilities frequently die at the hands of 
police.139  Further, an exceedingly permissive constitutional standard of 
review for excessive force means that compliance with police orders will not 
always guarantee a person’s safety.140 
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When police pepper-sprayed a nine-year-old Black girl, was it 
constitutional?141  There should be little doubt it was not.  Yet in the United 
States in 2021, police can seriously injure and kill citizens, disproportionately 
people of color, without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  Justice 
Scalia may have meant to exclude process and punishment concerns when 
stating that the balancing test involves only interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.142  But both rights relate to the security of one’s person.  The 
current standard allows police in the United States to kill or maim people 
who may be unarmed and innocent in a “split-second judgment,”143 whereas 
courts over the last forty-five years have sentenced to death many fewer 
people found guilty of gravely serious crimes.144  This result is absurd; in 
cases reaching trial and sentencing, the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments will afford greater personal security than the amendment which 
expressly affords that right.  In cases where police exceed their force 
authorizations, these amendments can be read as surplusage.  Even the first 
clause of the Fourth Amendment is surplus when it is so rarely invoked to 
protect individual rights. 
Graham has been applied as a minimum justification standard.145  
Accordingly, the Graham standard recommends a scheme for justifying 
unreasonable and intolerable police violence.146  This application cannot 
stand.  It fails to consider properly the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s 
text.147  Courts should revitalize the reasoning in Garner to formulate a 
serious balancing test between the individual’s interest in personal security 
and any governmental interest in effectuating an arrest.  The Fourth 
Amendment demands an aspiration to end the need for “the talk.”148 
CONCLUSION 
Courts must correct the constitutional controls on police use of force.  To 
do so, they should emphasize the textual “personal security” interest recently 
revived at the Supreme Court.  Reviewing courts should incorporate this 
interest into the Graham balancing test to determine reasonableness.  Garner 
properly weighs the individual’s interest in their personal security as interests 
in their life, limbs, health, and reputation, ensuring that courts may 
incorporate personal security interests without disrupting precedent. 
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